Applicability of the Agreement: The Agreement applies only to “a person who has served a sentence of imprisonment in a penitentiary or penitentiary establishment” (Articles III (a) and IV (a)) and therefore does not apply to a person awaiting trial. See United States vs. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711-12 (9th Cir.), certificate refused, 449 U.p. 880 (1980); United States v. Evans, 423 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff`d, 556 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1977). Since the agreement only applies to a prisoner based on a pending “indictment, information or complaint” requiring a “procedure” (Articles III (a) and IV (a)), the agreement does not apply to a prisoner based on a probation warrant.
See Reed, above. The procedure for the order of prisoners for a suspended offence is set at 18 U.S.C 4214 (b). The agreement also does not apply to probation criminals. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.p. 716 (1985). The agreement also provides that when a prisoner applies for an order in a case for which a prisoner has been filed, it is a request for a decision on all matters for which prisoners have been filed by the same “[S]tate”. Article III(d) In this context, the different federal districts have been separately designated as `[S]tates`.
See United States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1979), certificate refused, 446 U.p. 920 (1980). Prosecution of other charges that have not been the subject of any prisoner is not permitted by the agreement unless they result from the same transaction. (Article V(d)) ] It is not clear whether the examination of the latter is compulsory. If the U.S. attorney brings the Article IV motion, the indictment on which the motion is based must be completely eliminated before the prisoner returns (including all trials and convictions, according to some courts). If this is not the case, the accusation shall be rejected by prejudice, unless notification and a possibility of hearing are provided for in accordance with Article 9(2) of the Treaty. (Article IV(e)) In this context, the different federal districts were treated as separate states.
See United States v. Woods, 621 F.2d 844 (6th Cir.), cert. Denied, 449 U.p. 877 (1980). Other charges cannot be pursued at the same time, unless they result from the same transaction. (Article V(d)) ] Again, it is not clear whether testing the latter is mandatory or only allowed. Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (OACIO) National Association of Judicial Authorities (IAEA). The Commonwealth has the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in seeking the complainant`s return before it could find that the complainant was “unavailable” and therefore “unable to stand trial”, as stipulated in Rule 1100 and the Intergovernmental Agreement on Prisoners. Commonwealth v. Newman, 382 Pa.Super. 220, 229, 555 A.2d 151, 155 (1989), allocation refused, 540 pa.
580, 655 A.2d 512 (1995). The court minutes contain ample evidence that the Delaware County Prosecutor`s Office followed closely and requested the plaintiff`s return at any appropriate time, while the plaintiff was in federal jurisdiction. (N.T. 2/16/95-5-11). Consequently, the time between the receipt of the applicant`s application for final order *332 (26 August 1993) and the date of receipt of the applicant by fci Allenwood (16). November 1993), a total of eighty-two days, are duly set off against the limitation period of one hundred, eighty days. The plaintiff was brought to justice one hundred, forty-seven days later, well within the limit of one hundred, eighty days.. . .